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Abstract
Private equity buyouts have become a common element in the industrial development
process. I survey the literature on the real economic effect of buyouts: employment, wages,
productivity, and long-run investments. Employment tend to marginally fall after a buyout
in most countries studied, with the exception being France. There are clear evidence of
productivity gains following a buyout, with part of these being shared with worker through
higher wages. The evidence is mixed regarding effects on long-run investments.
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11 Introduction
Private equity buyouts are acquisitions of established companies undertaken by private equity
ﬁrms. They are partly ﬁnanced with debt and partly with equity raised from institutional in-
vestors for private equity funds with a predetermined life span. Private equity buyouts are also
known as leveraged buyouts or bootstrap acquisitions. When management participates, they
are sometimes called management buyouts.
The private equity industry took off during the 1980s. As a large wave of takeovers swept
across the U.S., buyouts became a new phenomenon that was much talked about and scruti-
nized. When the takeover wave receded at the end of the 1980s, so did the number of buyouts.
But as illustrated in Figure 1, it only took three years for buyouts to make their comeback and
break new records by spreading out from the U.S. During 2000 to 2007, a worldwide explosion
in the number of buyouts occurred and a staggering 79% of all buyouts between 1970 and 2009
took place after 1999. In particular, there has been an increase in the number of buyouts outside
the U.S. and the U.K. As illustrated by Figure 2, at the peak of the boom in the 1980s, 93% of
all buyouts took place in the U.S. or the U.K. At the peak of the boom in the 2000s, 53% of all
transactions took place in the U.S. or the U.K.
The spread of the buyout phenomenon has not escaped criticism (FSA, 2006; ITUC, 2007;
PSE, 2007). Labor unions and worker representatives claim that buyouts, through layoffs and
wage cuts, generate returns to investors at the expense of workers. Industry critics express
some concern about the detrimental effects of short holding periods by citing examples of
“quick ﬂips”, in which companies are sold off within two years after the buyout.
This has prompted the view that private equity ﬁrms are short-term investors that are always
on the lookout for a quick exit at the expense of employees, productivity and long-run invest-
ments. The private equity industry has not sat idle. Responding with studies of its own, its
interest organizations have refuted the accusations and claimed that buyouts create better com-
panies, increase job creation and promote long-term productivity (Achleitner and Klöckner,
2005; BVCA, 2006).
But why should a buyout affect employment, productivity and long-run investments? And
what are the empirically documented effects? This overview offers an answer by drawing
on a literature in economics and ﬁnance stretching back to the 1980s when the industry ﬁrst
emerged. Throughout, the emphasis will be on real effects, omitting such aspects as the effect
of a buyout on operating proﬁtability, returns to investors and tax payments. Studies that can-
not separate between the effects of venture capital and private equity investments will also be
omitted. For complementary overviews of the literature on buyouts covering these aspects, see
e.g. Cumming et al. (2007), Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) or Wright et al. (2009).
The real effects are important since a buyout has the potential of affecting static efﬁciency
(e.g. productivity), dynamic efﬁciency (e.g. innovation) and imposing (positive or negative)
externalities on stakeholders in the ﬁrm (e.g. the employees). Empirical and theoretical studies




























































































Figure 1: Number of closed or effective transactions worldwide from 1.1.1970-31.12.2009 in the Capi-
tal IQ database that are marked as LBO or MBO. For a careful discussion on the coverage of the Capital
IQ database, see Strömberg (2008).
on employment, wages, productivity, innovation and bankruptcy provide us with hints on what
the social welfare implications of an active private equity market are likely to be.
In sum, the literature has discussed several reasons why a private equity buyout could have
real effects. They can be grouped into three categories: a buyout reduces agency problems,
it introduces uncertainty and temporary owners, and brings in capital and knowledge to the
organization. These changes affect employees, productivity and long-run investments.
Reducing agency problems realigns the incentives between managers and owners and can
lead to reductions in employment and increases in productivity as the effects of empire building
become undone. The same effects can be expected from increased uncertainty and new owners
as it becomes easier to breach implicit contracts and implement changes in the organization.
Temporary ownership can increase incentives to improve productivity as private equity backed
ﬁrms maximize an exit valuation and thus take actions to increase the bidding competition in
case of a trade sale. But temporary ownership could also lead to a short-term focus negatively
affecting long-run investment. Finally, additional capital and better knowledge of management
practices are of importance. A capital injection can spur the growth of the ﬁrm (or a division of
a ﬁrm taken private) leading to increases in employment and new investments, and an improved
knowledge of operational management practices could lead to increases in productivity.
In broad terms, the empirical evidence is consistent with these predictions. Employment
tendtomarginallyfallafterabuyoutinmostcountriesstudied, withtheexceptionbeingFrance.
There are clear evidence of productivity gains following a buyout, with part of these being
shared with worker through higher wages. The evidence is mixed regarding effects on long-run
investments. In general, the evidence is consistent with buyouts leading to a reallocation of
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Figure 2: Geographical breakdown of the number of closed or effective transactions worldwide from
1.1.1970-31.12.2009 in the Capital IQ database that are marked as LBO or MBO. For a careful discus-
sion on the coverage of the Capital IQ database, see Strömberg (2008).
are catalysts of creative destruction.
Despite a growing literature on the real effects of buyouts, more research remains to be
done. So far, there is no formal theoretical foundation for the real effects of buyouts, and
more work is needed on determining the sources of static and dynamic efﬁciency changes post-
buyout. Future researchers should also delve further into disentangling the effect of private
equity ownership from the effect of ownership change, and ﬁgure out if the real effects have
changed over time or if they differ between the types of buyouts undertaken. Finally, as most
empirical evidence is from the U.S. or the U.K., we have little knowledge of how the real effects
vary across countries and if they do, why this is the case.
The roadmap reads as follows. Section 2 discusses why a buyout could have real economic
effects. Section 3 then surveys the empirical literature on the relation among buyouts and
employment, productivity, long-run investments and bankruptcy. Section 4 discusses further
research and concluding remarks are made in Section 5.
2 Why Could a Buyout have Real Effects?
While few formal analyses exist, and only some authors explicitly discuss real effects, the
literature on private equity buyouts provides a good basis for a discussion on the real effects
of buyouts. The ways in which a buyout could have real effects can be grouped into three
categories: a buyout reduces agency problems; it introduces uncertainty and temporary owners;
and it brings in new capital and better knowledge of management practices.
42.1 A buyout reduces agency problems
In foundational papers on the role of buyouts, Jensen (1986, 1989) argued that private equity
ﬁrms – or leveraged buyout associations – are an organizational form superior to the public
corporation as it is designed to reduce agency problems between dispersed owners and the
manager of the ﬁrm (Berle and Means, 1932: Jensen and Meckling 1976). Dispersed own-
ership allows managers to avoid hard and unpopular tasks such as ﬁring employees, reducing
wages and negotiating lower prices with suppliers. Without careful monitoring and the right in-
centives, managers can engage in empire building by hiring too many employees, acquiring too
many companies, or diversifying activities too much (Jensen 1986, Williamson 1964). Jensen
(1986, 1989) argued that a buyout could reduce these problems since private equity ﬁrms con-
centrate ownership, implement a close connection between pay and performance, and increase
leverage.
Concentrating ownership is central, since dispersed ownership in a public corporation is
accompanied with low incentives to monitor the manager. Monitoring the manager is a pub-
lic good and shareholders have incentives to free-ride on each other (Berle and Means 1932;
Williamson 1964; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). A buyout concentrates ownership and thereby
removes the free-riding problem. Once the free-riding problem is gone, problems with low
performance and empire building can be dealt with by implementing compensation contracts
tying performance to pay, and by increasing leverage.
Compensation contracts tying performance to pay align the interests of owners and the
manager and could thereby lead to improvements in productivity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976;
Holmström, 1979; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Alignment can also be achieved by the manager
receiving ownership in the ﬁrms or by him or her being required to invest in the ﬁrm. Increased
managerial ownership also has other beneﬁts. Under asymmetric information, it can lead man-
agers to reveal information to the owners they would otherwise not have disclosed (Opler and
Titman, 1993; Lazear, 2005). Moreover, if the manager is required to take a large stake in the
company and refuses, he/she might not have disclosed all relevant information.
Increased leverage can help reduce agency problems as, apart from ﬁnancing the transac-
tion, it forces the manager to pay out “free cash ﬂows” (Murphy, 1985; Jensen, 1986). Free
cash ﬂow is money left in the ﬁrm after all projects with a positive net present value have been
funded. Increasing leverage is a way of forcing the manager to return free cash ﬂow to the
owners instead of investing the funds in projects with a negative net present value. Increased
debt also makes the probability of default and managerial turnover larger and therefore leads to
increased efforts by the manager (Grossman and Hart, 1982; Zwiebel, 1996). Moreover, when
combined with ownership in the ﬁrm, debt increases the pay sensitivity of the manager, making
him or her more likely to operate in the interests of the owners.
The changes in ownership concentration, managerial ownership and leverage are likely to
have real effects. If dispersed ownership, a weak connection between pay and performance, and
5too low leverage allowed the previous management to hire too many employees and diversify
operations too much, a buyout can have real effects by reversing the damage done and thereby
leading to a decrease in employment and an increase in productivity.
The increase in leverage could also have a negative impact on long-run investment and
employee wages. There exists evidence of a negative correlation between R&D spending and
leverage(HimmelbergandPetersen, 1994)andincreasedleveragegivesmorebargainingpower
totheﬁrminwagenegotiations(theﬁrmcancrediblythreatennottoundertakenewinvestments
unless wages are reduced as argued by Perotti and Spier (1993)). In addition, too much debt
can lead to debt overhang resulting in reduced investment incentives (Myers, 1977). Finally,
increased leverage could lead to an increased risk of bankruptcy and, in the extreme, a full
shutdown of operations.
2.2 A buyout introduces uncertainty and new temporary owners
Besides reducing agency problems, a buyout introduces uncertainty and temporary owners.
Schaefer (1998) argues that it can be easier to change compensation structures and improve
productivity by moving people to new positions within the organization when employees feel
less secure in their jobs.
The ownership change itself may also be important. Shleifer and Summers (1988) argue
that an ownership change makes it easier to breach implicit contracts with workers, suppliers
and other stakeholders. An entrenched manager facing a difﬁcult situation could also have a
harder time letting employees go, or shifting resources to more productive uses, than if this
manager were to be replaced by a new manager as a result of the ownership change. Replacing
the manager is easier if an ownership change takes place. As argued by Cuny and Talmor
(2007), new owners have the advantage of not having a tight relationship with the manager
which allows them to consider all turnaround possibilities, even those that involve replacing
the manager.
The new owners are also temporary owners. The median holding period of a company is
6 years according to Kaplan and Strömberg (2009). As temporary owners, they could face
different incentives to undertake long-run investments and restructuring activities as compared
to more permanent owners.
A reduction in long-term investments could be a concern in “quick ﬂips” (deals in which
the holding period is shorter than two years). These deals are proﬁtable. Using a dataset of
around 7500 investments of 250 private equity ﬁrms worldwide from 1971 to 2005, Lopez-de-
Silanes et al. (2009) show that short holding periods (less than two years) generated an average
IRR (internal rate of return) of 79%, in comparison to an IRR of 10% for investments held
longer than four years. Incentives to perform "quick ﬂips" thus exist, and it is easy to imagine
that long-run investments could be sacriﬁced for more short-term gains. An argument against
this, however, is that the eventual buyer will care about the long-run value of the ﬁrm and thus
6temporary owners should have no incentives to sacriﬁce long-run investments for short-run
gains as this would depress the exit valuation of the target ﬁrm.
Temporary ownership can also lead to increased incentives to improve productivity. Nor-
bäck et al. (2010) argue that if buyouts take place in concentrated industries and are exited
through trade sales, private equity ﬁrms maximizing trade sale revenues have stronger incen-
tives than more permanent owners to ensure the management team works hard at restructuring
the ﬁrm. The intuition is that the possible buyers are willing to pay for both the restructured
assets and to prevent a rival from obtaining them. The more productive the assets are, the more
valuable it is for bidders both to obtain the assets and prevent a rival from obtaining them. Since
permanent owners do not maximize trade sale revenues, temporary ownership should lead to
relative increases in productivity.
2.3 A buyout brings in capital and knowledge
Additionalcapitalandimprovedknowledgeofmanagementpracticeshavethepotentialoflead-
ing to increases in employment, productivity and long-run investments. Boucly et al. (2009)
argue that in some environments, buyouts can be a good substitute for other sources of capital
and thereby increase employment growth. The authors support their argument using French
data for 830 buyouts in France during 1994-2004 by showing that the strongest employment
growth is observed in industries where external ﬁnancing is often needed for the industries to
grow.
A buyout can also be a way for a capital-constrained division manager to secure ﬁnancing
for taking the division private (if the company is interested in selling it). This motivation
for buyouts have been discussed in the management literature (Fox and Marcus, 1992; Zahra,
1995; Wright et al., 2000, 2001). The main argument is that buyouts help entrepreneurial
managers escape the bureaucracy of large corporations. Empirical support for this argument is
given in Fidrmuc et al. (2008). They study a sample of 221 U.K. public-to private transactions
completed between 1997 and 2003. They show that management buyouts take place without
the help of private equity ﬁrms if management can itself reap the beneﬁts of the deal, but that
management brings in private equity ﬁrms when the ﬁrm has less cash, the manager holds a
smaller equity share and the ﬁrm is large; exactly when additional external capital is needed.
Alleviating credit constrained managers in divisional (management) buyouts can have a
positive effect on long-run investments. For example, Gertner et al. (1994) argue that internal
ﬁnancing of a project can reduce innovation incentives because the ﬁrm controls the project
and can extract rents from a manager ex post. External ﬁnancing then improves the innovation
incentives. Gromb and Scharfstein (2002) argue that internal development of a project can
come with costs, as a manager in charge of the project can be redeployed inside the ﬁrm if the
project fails. This reduces the incentives to work hard on the innovation. Outside development,
on the other hand, makes the manager work harder as he or she is forced to ﬁnd a new job if
7the project fails. Hellmann (2007) also presents a multi-task model arguing that in equilibrium,
employees sometimes leave the ﬁrm and develop an innovation externally because the ﬁrm
wants the employee to focus on its core tasks instead of spending time on developing new
innovations.
Private equity ﬁrms also bring with them knowledge about management practices. This
could lead to improvements in productivity. Using data on management practices in around
4,000 medium sized manufacturing ﬁrms world-wide, Bloom et al. (2009) show that private
equity backed ﬁrms are, on average, better managed than privately owned ﬁrms, family ﬁrms
or government-owned ﬁrms. The reason is a lack of a “tail” of badly managed ﬁrms; almost all
private equity backed ﬁrms have good management practices. They also show that private eq-
uity backed ﬁrms tend to be particularly good at operational management practices, suggesting
that a buyout could have a positive inﬂuence on productivity by bringing in good knowledge of
management practices.
In sum, there are multiple reasons why a buyout could have real effects. While the effects
on employment and long-run investments could go either way, most arguments favor increases
in productivity.
3 What are the Empirically Documented Effects?
Empirical studies on the real effects have found evidence consistent with the above discussion.
Most empirical studies, but not all, have found that a buyout is correlated with increases in
productivity, weakly negative or no effects on employment, weak increases in wages, and small
or no effects on long-run investments. There are no effects on the bankruptcy rate, although it
varies over time and across countries. This evidence is summarized in Table 1 available in the
Appendix.
3.1 Employment and wages
Perhaps the most controversial issue regarding buyouts is the effect of a buyout on employees.
While labor unions are often quick to point out examples of large layoffs following a buyout,
private equity associations often underscore that targets tend to grow in size after the buyout.
Empirical studies on the employment effects of buyouts have, on average, found no or weakly
negative effects on employment and slight positive effects on wages. The exception is France,
where buyouts have a strong positive effect on employment.
Evidence from the U.S. suggests that employment effects are weakly negative. Kaplan
(1989) studies a sample of 48 large management buyouts that took place between 1980 and
1986 and ﬁnds that median employment increased by 0.9% if divestures are counted as job
losses. In relation to the industry median, however, ﬁrms subject to a buyout have a 12% lower
job growth. Not counting ﬁrms that divest more than 10% of the buyout value – leaving a
8sample of 26 ﬁrms – the median job growth is 6.2% slower than the industry median. This is
similar to Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) who study a sample of 72 U.S. ﬁrms that under-
went a leveraged buyout and subsequently went public again between 1976 and 1987. They
ﬁnd a decline in employment of 0.6% between the time the buyout took place and when the
ﬁrm went public. This is lower than for the comparison group, and it can be attributed to di-
vestures; they ﬁnd an increase in median employment by 17% for the 12 ﬁrms that did not do
divestures. Leveraged buyouts between 1986 and 1989 could have had less of an effect on em-
ployment. Opler (1992) studies 44 public to private leveraged buyouts and ﬁnds no signiﬁcant
employment effects of the buyout.
A drawback of using ﬁrm level data is the difﬁculty in separating out employment effects
arising from organic growth from those arising from acquisitions and divestitures. Plant level
studies can separate between these effects.
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) gather plant level data on 1108 plants that underwent a lever-
aged buyout or a management buyout between 1983 and 1986. Their total sample, including
the comparison group, is on around 12,000 manufacturing plants observed between 1972 and
1986. They ﬁnd a cumulative decline in white collar employment of 8.5% over three years
(one year pre and two years post buyout). However, blue collar employment declines are not
statistically signiﬁcant. Hence, the main employment effect is on white-collar workers: the
ratio of white-collar to blue-collar workers declines by 6.5% relative to the industry average.
In addition, they ﬁnd a cumulative three-year (one year pre- and two years post-buyout) rela-
tive increase in blue-collar wages of 3.6% for annual wages and 2.3% for hourly wages. This
indicates that job creation and job losses do not occur with the same intensity up and down the
corporate hierarchy. White-collar workers draw the shortest straw.
Using more recent and comprehensive plant level data, Davis et al. (2008) collect a dataset
of around 300,000 U.S. establishments operated by about 4,500 ﬁrms subject to a leveraged
buyout between 1980 and 2005. Comparing with a control group at the establishment level
matched on industry, age and size, they ﬁnd an average cumulative two-year relative employ-
ment decline of 7% at target establishments remaining with the ﬁrm. They also ﬁnd slower
employment growth at target establishments before as well as after the buyout, suggesting that
buyouts of quickly growing ﬁrms are not common. Gross job creation is similar between the
comparison group and targets, so it is likely that job destruction at target establishments is
driving the results. But the decrease in employment at remaining establishments is partly off-
set by the creation of new establishments. For a smaller sample of around 1,300 transactions,
they show that target ﬁrms tend to create more new establishments. This leads to a two-year
cumulative relative 6% increase in job creation. Continuing their work using a dataset on 1,400
manufacturing ﬁrms subject to a leveraged buyout between 1980 and 2005, Davis et al. (2009)
show that continuing establishments at targets pay workers a wage that is 1.1% higher than
continuing establishments in the comparison group around the time of the transaction. How-
ever, this difference disappears two years after the transaction. Thus, U.S. evidence suggests
9negative effects on employment, but positive wage effects for employees remaining with the
target.
Evidence from U.K. buyouts is similar, although somewhat weaker. Wright et al. (1992)
study a survey sample of 182 leveraged buyouts at the ﬁrm level for 1983-1986 and conclude
that post-buyout, an initial decline in employment of around 6.3% occurs. It recovers over
time to 4.5% below the pre-buyout level. Amess and Wright (2007) study a sample of 1,350
management buyouts and management buy-ins observed at the ﬁrm level between 1999 and
2004. They ﬁnd no correlation with changes in employment or wages, but they do ﬁnd a
slight decrease in wages relative to the comparison group. They also ﬁnd heterogeneity in
the employment effects between buy-ins and buyouts. Management buy-ins tended to have a
relatively lower employment and wage growth than management buyouts.
No aggregate effects on employment are in line with Amess et al. (2008) who show, using a
sample of 232 leveraged buyouts observed between 1996 and 2006, that private equity backed
buyouts have no effect on employment or wage growth relative to the comparison group. How-
ever, Cressy et al. (2007) study a sample of 57 buyouts matched with 83 comparison ﬁrms for
1995-2002 and ﬁnd that over the ﬁrst post-buyout year, employment falls by 7% relative to the
comparison group. This grows to 23% below that of the comparison group over the ﬁrst four
years. In year ﬁve, employment increases relative to the comparison group. This is similar to
evidence from Weir et al. (2008) who studied 122 public to private buyouts between 1998 and
2004 and found job losses for the ﬁrst two years after going private, but subsequent increases
in years four and ﬁve as compared to ﬁrms remaining public.
Evidence on employment effects beyond the U.S. and the U.K. is scarce. Buyouts in Swe-
den have no effect on employment and wages, at least according to Bergström et al. (2007) who
use a sample of 69 buyouts between 1993 and 2005. The evidence from France is drastically
different. Boucly et al. (2009) study 830 buyouts in France that took place between 1994 and
2004. Compared to the comparison group, they ﬁnd a remarkable employment growth of 13%
in the period three years before the transaction to four years after. They argue that most of the
gains come from organic growth. This ﬁnding is in sharp contrast to studies from the U.S. and
the U.K. The authors argue that buyouts in France work as a substitute for weak capital mar-
kets and thereby help ﬁnance ﬁrm growth. At a more aggregate level, Bernstein et al. (2010)
study the effect of private equity on industry performance worldwide. Using a sample of about
14,300 leveraged buyout transactions and industry data across all OECD countries, they ﬁnd
that from 1991 to 2007, industries that have received private equity investment in the last ﬁve
years have grown more quickly than other industries in terms of employment, total production
and value added.
Besides the employment and wage effects of a buyout, survey evidence exists on how a
buyout affects worker discretion, involvement and training. Amess et al. (2007) study a sample
of 1,959 ﬁrms and 27,263 employees from the UK Workplace Employee Relations Survey and
ﬁnd that companies subject to a management buyout give craft and skilled service employees
10more discretion. These workers also tended to be less supervised. This suggests that manage-
ment buyouts reduce hierarchical tiers and layers of middle management, consistent with the
evidence from Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) mainly showing employment declines for white-
collar workers. Further, Bruining et al. (2005) study a survey sample of 145 buyouts in the
U.K. and 45 in the Netherlands and ﬁnd a positive effect on employer training and employee
involvement (with the effects being stronger in the U.K. than in the Netherlands).
3.2 Productivity
Empirical evidence suggests that a buyout is correlated with enhanced productivity partly aris-
ing from a reorganization of operations: private equity ﬁrms tend to close low productivity
establishments and open new more productive ones. Outsourcing of intermediate goods also
allows a reduction in labor intensity, thus contributing to productivity growth.
Using U.S. data, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) study total factor productivity at the plant
level. They ﬁnd that plants involved in leveraged or management buyouts experience a sub-
stantial increase in productivity as compared to control plants not going through a buyout. The
median productivity difference one to three years after the buyout is 5.9%. Further, plants se-
lected for a buyout are more productive than comparable plants even before the buyout: the
median productivity difference one to three years before the buyout is 2.3%. The gains in pro-
ductivity are not related to reductions in wages, R&D or capital expenditures. This evidence is
consistent with Davis et al.’s (2009) study of a dataset of 1,400 manufacturing ﬁrms operating
14,000 establishments subject to a buyout between 1980 and 2005. They ﬁnd 2% greater pro-
ductivity growth at targets in relation to the comparison group within two years following the
buyout. Labor productivity was, on average, about 5.2% higher. Productivity growth is divided
such that two thirds are due to productivity improvements at continuing establishments while
one third comes from productivity contributions from new establishments. Net entry of estab-
lishments happens because targets, in relation to the comparison group, are more likely to close
underperforming establishments and open new ones. Davis et al. (2009) estimate that private
equity transactions in their sample resulted in an additional real output of up to $15 billion in
2007 – an economically signiﬁcant effect.
Evidence from the U.K. is also available. Amess (2002) studies a ﬁrm-level sample of 78
U.K. management buyouts taking place over the period 1986 to 1997. Compared to a con-
trol sample of 156 ﬁrms matched on input characteristics, he ﬁnds that management buyouts
tended to increase relative productivity in the manufacturing of machinery and equipment in-
dustry, leading to a 16.13% increase in output. In line with this, Amess (2003) ﬁnds, using
a similar dataset, that the technical efﬁciency of ﬁrms that underwent a management buyout
has a higher efﬁciency two years before the transaction and higher efﬁciency levels of 7%,
7.5%, 4% and 7% in the four years following the buyout. Harris et al. (2005) gather data for
979 management buyouts and 4,877 manufacturing establishments in the U.K. that underwent
11a management buyout during 1994 to 1998 and show that total factor productivity increases
substantially (70.5-90.3%) relative to the comparison group (their total sample covers 35,752
establishments). The authors argue that the productivity increase is due to a reduction in labor
intensity of production made possible through outsourcing of intermediate goods and materials.
They also ﬁnd that pre-buyout total factor productivity at targets is 1.6-2.0% lower in relation
to the comparison group, thus suggesting that less productive establishments are targeted for
buyouts. However, this is in contrast to Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) and Amess (2003) who
ﬁnd that more productive establishments are targeted for buyouts.
3.3 Long-run investments
The impact of a buyout on long-run investments has been studied by focusing on expendi-
tures on R&D and patenting intensity. The empirical evidence is mixed. Studies on R&D
expenditures have found both positive and negative changes following a buyout, while studies
on patenting intensity show a concentration in patenting activity towards more economically
signiﬁcant patents and towards the ﬁrm’s historical focus.
Using U.S. data, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) ﬁnd that target plants are less R&D in-
tensive than non-target plants (2.5% lower in mean one to three years before the buyout) and
that targets tend to be concentrated in less R&D intense industries. However, relative to the
comparison group they ﬁnd no signiﬁcant difference in R&D spending. This is consistent with
Hall (1990) who studies a sample of around 80 leveraged buyouts between 1977 and 1988 and
ﬁnds that buyouts tended to take place in industries with little R&D. She ﬁnds no large effects
on R&D spending of an LBO, but reductions as a result of corporate acquisitions with high
leverage. Smith (1990) studies the post-buyout performance of around 58 management buy-
outs between 1977 and 1986 and Opler (1992) studies 44 public to private leveraged buyouts
between 1985 and 1989. Neither does Smith (1990) or Opler (1992) ﬁnd any negative effects
of an LBO on R&D spending. Zahra (1995), who studies a survey sample of 47 management
buyouts, does not ﬁnd any effect on R&D spending. He does, however, ﬁnd some evidence that
there is an increase in product development, technology related alliances, and new business
creation activities. This is similar to Wright et al. (1992) who show that a full 62% of surveyed
ﬁrms subject to a buyout in the U.K. reported that the buyout allowed them to develop new
products they would otherwise not have developed. A negative effect on R&D expenditures is
found in Long and Ravenscraft (1993) who also ﬁnd that leveraged buyouts tended to take place
in less R&D intense companies (roughly 50% less than the mean in manufacturing). Their sam-
ple consists of 72 leveraged buyouts with R&D spending and 126 leveraged buyouts without
any R&D spending between 1981 and 1987 (they use a control group of 3,329 ﬁrms). The
drop in R&D expenditures post buyout is around 40%, but companies reducing R&D spending
tended to do worse than the ﬁrms that did not.
Another measure of long-run investments is patents; evidence suggests that a buyout leads
12to a concentration in patenting efforts and an increase in the economic signiﬁcance of patents
applied for. Lerner et al. (2008) study 495 U.S. leveraged buyouts undertaken between 1983
and 2005 and link them to patents and patent citations from the US Patent and Trademark Of-
ﬁce. They ﬁnd that post-buyout, more “important” innovations are patented, with “importance”
measured by patent citations, and the patent portfolio becomes more focused: patents tend to
concentrate in to patent classes where the target has had its historical focus. However, there are
no effects on patent originality, generality or quantity.
Using a cross-country sample, Ughetto (2010) studies the patenting activity of a sample of
681 Western European manufacturing ﬁrms subject to a buyout between 1998 and 2004. She
ﬁnds that the average number of patents increases by around 50% after as compared to before
the buyout. The characteristics of the leveraged buyout affect patenting intensity. In particular,
syndicated buyouts, buyouts with a buyout-specialized lead investor, or buyouts with a lead
investor with a large portfolio tend to be buyouts where patenting activity increased the most.
Geographical proximity and location do not correlate with patenting intensity.
3.4 Bankruptcy
One channel through which a buyout could have real effects is by increasing the risk of bank-
ruptcy (due to increased leverage) and thus, in the extreme, it could lead to a full shutdown
of operations. However, no studies have found a clear connection between a buyout and an
increase in the probability of a bankruptcy, although there is evidence that the bankruptcy rate
varies over time and across countries.
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) examine a sample of 17,171 buyouts undertaken worldwide
between 1970 and 2007 and ﬁnd that 6% of all deals have ended in bankruptcy or reorganiza-
tion. With an average holding period of six years, it is consistent with an annual bankruptcy rate
of 1.2%; lower than the average default rate of 1.6% for U.S. corporate bond issuers between
1980 and 2002. However, it is higher than the 0.6% bankruptcy rate for U.S. publicly traded
ﬁrms (Wright et al. 2009). Boucly et al.’s (2009) study of 830 buyouts in France during 1994-
2004 ﬁnd no increase in bankruptcy rates after a buyout as compared to their control group. At
some point, 6.1% of the targets and ﬁrms in the comparison group will go bankrupt. Within
three years after the buyout, 3.5% of both targets and ﬁrms in the comparison group ended up
in bankruptcy.
Yet, the bankruptcy rate varies with the business cycle and across countries. Kaplan and
Stein (1993) study a sample of 41 U.S. management buyouts that took place between 1980
and 1984. Only one of the deals (2%) defaulted. But of the 83 management buyouts in their
sample between 1985 and 1989, a full 27% defaulted and a total of almost 11% ended up in
bankruptcy.
Lopez-de-Silanes et al. (2009) document that around 10% of all deals (world-wide) in their
sample ended in bankruptcy, with the bankruptcy rate varying from 5% in Scandinavia, to 8%
13in France, 10% in the U.K, 12% in the U.S and a full 13% in Germany. A caveat, however, is
that they deﬁne bankruptcy as either reported bankruptcy in the Private Placement Memoranda
or as a deal not giving returns to capital (which could be for other reasons than a bankruptcy).
Even if a default on debt occurs, it may not have any real effects. Andrade and Kaplan
(1998) study 31 of the management buyouts in Kaplan and Stein (1993) that later became
ﬁnancially distressed (due to high leverage). They ﬁnd that ﬁrms in their sample had a slight
positiveincreaseinvaluebeforetheybecameﬁnanciallydistressed, suggestingthat, onaverage,
the value of the ﬁrm does not actually decline.
4 Where we Stand
Empirical studies have found that employment reductions tend to occur in the U.S. and also to
some extent in the U.K., but that that buyouts in France contribute to job growth. Wages tend
to increase slightly for blue-collar workers and for workers at establishments that remain with
the ﬁrm. The empirical studies have also found that a buyout seems to have positive effects on
productivity, with evidence suggesting that it arises from increased labor productivity and from
closing down unproductive establishments and opening more productive ones. Outsourcing of
intermediate materials and goods also provides contributions. Further, the empirical studies
have found that the effect of a buyout on long-run investments is mixed. We have indications
that buyouts tend to take place in less R&D intense industries, but evidence is mixed on whether
R&D spending increases or decreases. Patenting activity post-buyout seems to concentrate on
more economically meaningful patents and patenting activity seems to depend on characteris-
tics of the deal and who is the lead investor.
Butmuchmoreworkremainstobedone. Inparticular, thefollowingdimensionsarefruitful
avenues for further research.
First, formal economic theory on the real effects of buyouts is almost non-existent, even
though buyouts have existed since the 1980s. Increased efforts to develop a solid theoretical
foundation would enhance our understanding of the role of buyouts in the economy, of the
mechanisms behind externalities in a buyout, and the effects a buyout could have on static and
dynamic efﬁciency. Further, a better developed formal framework would allow us to ask more
general questions relating to the social welfare effects of buyouts. It would also be helpful in
guiding future empirical work.
Second, future empirical studies should put more effort into determining the sources of
changes in static and dynamic efﬁciency following a buyout. Studies such as Davis et al. (2009)
are able to link the productivity improvements to closing less productive plants and opening
new more productive ones and to increases in labor productivity following a buyout. But there
may be other sources. For example, apart from reorganization of establishments, an internal
reorganization of employees could have productivity enhancing effects, and improvements in
management practices documented in Bloom et al. (2009) may also play an important role.
14Studies of buyouts using matched employer-employee datasets could shed some more light on
these issues.
Third, more efforts in disentangling if real effects arise because of an ownership change or
because of actions taken by private equity ﬁrms are needed. While it would to some extent be
an apples-to-oranges comparison, disentangling the effects of an ownership change due to a
merger from the effects of an ownership change due to a private equity buyout (in the spirit of
Amess et al. (2008)) would be useful for understanding the possible effects of ﬁnancial buyers
on the real economy.
Fourth, future work should be dedicated to asking if the real effects differ across countries,
and if so, why? Most empirical studies on real effects so far have been conducted on U.S.
and U.K. transactions, yet there are indications that the real effects differ across countries. For
example, evidence on employment suggests that buyouts in France have drastically different
effects than buyouts in the U.S. and the U.K., indicating that country-speciﬁc factors could be
important.
Finally, more work on how the real effects of buyouts change over time and with the type
of buyout undertaken would be useful. The type of buyouts undertaken and the changes im-
plemented by private equity ﬁrms after the buyout are likely to have changed over time as the
industry has evolved and become more competitive. As argued by Holmström and Kaplan
(2001), there were two reasons behind the takeover wave and the emergence of the buyout
industry in the 1980s. First, deregulation coupled with new information and communication
technologies introduced a gap between realized performance and potential performance that
was maintained due to agency problems. Second, institutional investments in capital markets
grew which facilitated the ﬁnancing of takeovers aimed at improving performance. The combi-
nation of these two factors caused a wave of takeovers and the birth of buyouts. But as corpora-
tions improved governance and competition for targets increased, it is likely that private equity
ﬁrms sought new ways of creating value and thriving in different institutional environments.
While ﬁnancial engineering (removing ﬁnancial inefﬁciencies) and concentrating ownership to
improve governance could have been the key drivers of their activities in the 1980s, the buyouts
of today could be driven by other considerations more related to implementing better manage-
ment practices and removing operational and strategic inefﬁciencies. Some types of buyouts
could have stronger real effects than others. For example, Amess and Wright (2007) ﬁnd differ-
ent effects on employees depending on if a management buyout or a management buy-in took
place, and Ughetto (2010) found ample evidence that the characteristics of the deal correlated
with increases in patents after a buyout.
5 Concluding Remarks
This overview has argued that a buyout is likely to have real effects. By reducing agency prob-
lems, introducing uncertainty and temporary owners, and bringing in capital and knowledge,
15a buyout can cause changes in employment, productivity and long-run investments. Employ-
ment tend to marginally fall after a buyout in most countries studied, with the exception being
France. There are clear evidence of productivity gains following a buyout, with part of these
being shared with worker through higher wages. The evidence is mixed regarding effects on
long-runinvestments. Thus, mostoftheconcernsofindustrycriticsseemunwarranted. Though
job losses do occur following buyouts, there is no consistent evidence on reductions in long-run
investments, and ample evidence that increases in productivity follow from a buyout. Through
the real effects on the companies they acquire, private equity ﬁrms undertaking buyouts seem
to be an important part of the industrial development process.
The results from academic studies are useful to keep in mind, in particular when evaluating
policy proposals. Yet, more work is to be done on what role private equity ﬁrms ﬁll in society
as owners of assets. The real effects of private equity buyouts should prove a fruitful area for
researchers for many years to come.
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p
o
i
n
t
s
 
l
o
w
e
r
 
f
o
r
 
M
B
l
s
.
 
W
a
g
e
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
i
s
 
0
.
3
1
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
l
o
w
e
r
 
f
o
r
 
M
B
O
s
 
a
n
d
 
0
.
9
7
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
p
o
i
n
t
s
 
l
o
w
e
r
 
f
o
r
 
M
B
l
s
.
-
-
A
m
e
s
s
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
(
2
0
0
7
)
M
a
t
c
h
e
d
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
r
-
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
o
f
 
1
,
9
5
9
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
a
n
d
 
2
7
,
2
6
3
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
.
1
9
9
8
U
.
K
.
U
K
 
W
o
r
k
p
l
a
c
e
 
E
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
 
R
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
S
u
r
v
e
y
.
R
a
n
d
o
m
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
r
d
e
r
e
d
 
p
r
o
b
i
t
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
.
E
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
’
 
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
 
o
v
e
r
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
w
o
r
k
 
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
s
 
i
s
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
i
n
 
M
B
O
 
f
i
r
m
s
;
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
u
l
a
r
l
y
 
f
o
r
 
c
r
a
f
t
 
a
n
d
 
s
k
i
l
l
e
d
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
.
 
F
o
r
 
t
h
e
s
e
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
,
 
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
a
l
s
o
 
l
o
w
e
r
.
-
-
A
m
e
s
s
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
(
2
0
0
8
)
2
3
2
 
L
B
O
s
 
(
d
i
v
i
d
e
d
 
 
i
n
t
o
 
M
B
O
s
,
 
M
B
I
s
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
e
q
u
i
t
y
)
 
a
n
d
 
 
2
1
5
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
 
t
o
 
a
c
q
u
i
s
i
t
i
o
n
s
.
 
A
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
o
f
 
2
3
,
4
6
8
 
f
i
r
m
s
.
 
1
9
9
6
-
2
0
0
6
U
.
K
.
C
M
B
O
R
;
 
Z
e
p
h
y
r
;
 
F
A
M
E
.
M
u
l
t
i
n
o
m
i
a
l
 
p
r
o
b
i
t
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
,
 
a
n
d
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
-
i
n
-
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
m
o
d
e
l
s
.
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
e
q
u
i
t
y
 
b
a
c
k
e
d
 
L
B
O
s
 
h
a
v
e
 
n
o
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
i
m
p
a
c
t
 
o
n
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
o
r
 
w
a
g
e
s
.
 
-
-
B
e
r
g
s
t
r
ö
m
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
(
2
0
0
7
)
7
3
 
L
B
O
s
.
1
9
9
3
-
2
0
0
6
S
w
e
d
e
n
S
w
e
d
i
s
h
 
C
o
m
p
a
n
i
e
s
 
R
e
g
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
O
f
f
i
c
e
;
 
M
e
r
g
e
r
m
a
r
k
e
t
;
 
F
a
c
t
i
v
a
;
 
O
r
b
i
s
;
 
A
f
f
ä
r
s
d
a
t
a
C
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
Z
-
 
a
n
d
 
J
1
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
.
 
O
L
S
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
.
N
o
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
n
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
o
r
 
w
a
g
e
s
.
-
-
B
e
r
n
s
t
e
i
n
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
(
2
0
1
0
)
1
4
,
3
0
0
 
l
e
v
e
r
a
g
e
d
 
b
u
y
o
u
t
 
t
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
w
o
r
l
d
w
i
d
e
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
d
a
t
a
 
a
c
r
o
s
s
 
a
l
l
 
O
E
C
D
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
.
1
9
9
1
-
2
0
0
7
O
E
C
D
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
i
Q
;
 
O
E
C
D
’
s
 
S
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
a
l
 
A
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
 
D
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
 
(
S
T
A
N
)
.
O
L
S
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
.
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
h
a
v
e
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
e
q
u
i
t
y
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
p
a
s
t
 
f
i
v
e
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
h
a
v
e
 
g
r
o
w
n
 
m
o
r
e
 
q
u
i
c
k
l
y
 
t
h
a
n
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
e
r
m
s
 
o
f
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
.
 
T
h
e
r
e
 
i
s
 
n
o
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
l
o
w
 
o
r
 
h
i
g
h
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
e
q
u
i
t
y
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
.
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
h
a
v
e
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
e
q
u
i
t
y
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
p
a
s
t
 
f
i
v
e
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
h
a
v
e
 
g
r
o
w
n
 
m
o
r
e
 
q
u
i
c
k
l
y
 
t
h
a
n
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
e
r
m
s
 
o
f
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
d
d
e
d
.
 
T
h
e
r
e
 
i
s
 
n
o
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
l
o
w
 
o
r
 
h
i
g
h
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
e
q
u
i
t
y
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
.
-
B
o
u
c
l
y
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
(
2
0
0
9
)
8
3
0
 
L
B
O
s
.
 
3
,
9
1
3
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
t
o
 
m
a
t
c
h
 
t
h
e
 
L
B
O
s
 
o
n
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
,
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
,
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
o
n
 
a
s
s
e
t
.
1
9
9
4
-
2
0
0
4
F
r
a
n
c
e
S
D
C
 
P
l
a
t
i
n
u
m
;
 
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
I
Q
;
 
B
R
N
.
O
L
S
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
f
o
r
 
t
i
m
e
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
r
m
.
L
B
O
 
t
a
r
g
e
t
s
 
h
a
v
e
 
a
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
t
h
a
t
 
i
s
 
 
a
r
o
u
n
d
 
1
3
%
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
t
h
a
n
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
 
o
v
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
 
o
f
 
t
h
r
e
e
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
p
r
e
-
b
u
y
o
u
t
 
t
o
 
f
o
u
r
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
p
o
s
t
-
b
u
y
o
u
t
.
-
-
T
a
b
l
e
 
1
:
 
A
c
a
d
e
m
i
c
 
s
t
u
d
i
e
s
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
f
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
e
q
u
i
t
y
 
b
u
y
o
u
t
s
 
o
n
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
,
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
,
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
o
n
.A
u
t
h
o
r
 
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
d
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
T
i
m
e
 
s
p
a
n
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
D
a
t
a
 
s
o
u
r
c
e
M
e
t
h
o
d
 
o
f
 
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
I
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
o
n
B
r
u
i
n
i
n
g
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
(
2
0
0
5
)
1
4
5
 
b
u
y
o
u
t
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
U
K
 
a
n
d
 
4
5
 
b
u
y
o
u
t
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
.
1
9
9
2
-
1
9
9
8
U
.
K
.
 
/
 
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
C
M
B
O
R
;
 
S
u
r
v
e
y
.
Z
-
t
e
s
t
 
o
f
 
p
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
t
-
t
e
s
t
 
f
o
r
 
e
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
m
e
a
n
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
L
e
v
e
n
e
'
s
 
F
-
t
e
s
t
 
f
o
r
 
e
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
v
a
r
i
a
n
c
e
s
.
H
R
 
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
i
m
p
r
o
v
e
d
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
a
n
 
L
B
O
.
 
T
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
,
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
 
i
n
v
o
l
v
e
m
e
n
t
,
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
 
a
l
l
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
.
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
s
t
r
o
n
g
e
r
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
U
.
K
.
 
a
s
 
c
o
m
p
a
r
e
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
.
-
-
C
r
e
s
s
y
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
(
2
0
0
8
)
5
7
 
b
u
y
o
u
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
a
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
o
f
 
8
3
 
m
a
t
c
h
e
d
 
c
o
m
p
a
n
i
e
s
.
1
9
9
5
-
2
0
0
2
U
.
K
.
V
e
n
t
u
r
e
 
E
x
p
e
r
t
,
 
F
A
M
E
.
H
e
c
k
m
a
n
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
,
 
l
o
g
-
l
i
n
e
a
r
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
.
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
f
a
l
l
s
 
b
y
 
7
%
 
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
y
e
a
r
 
p
o
s
t
-
b
u
y
o
u
t
.
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
r
e
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
2
3
%
 
o
v
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
f
o
u
r
 
y
e
a
r
s
,
 
b
u
t
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
f
t
h
 
y
e
a
r
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
b
u
y
o
u
t
.
-
-
D
a
v
i
s
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
(
2
0
0
8
)
4
,
5
0
0
 
U
S
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
(
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
3
0
0
,
0
0
0
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
)
 
t
h
a
t
 
u
n
d
e
r
w
e
n
t
 
a
n
 
L
B
O
 
a
n
d
 
1
.
4
 
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
.
1
9
8
0
-
2
0
0
5
U
.
S
.
L
B
D
;
 
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
I
Q
;
 
D
e
a
l
o
g
i
c
;
 
S
D
C
.
C
o
m
p
a
r
i
n
g
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
.
 
O
L
S
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
.
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
t
w
o
-
y
e
a
r
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
d
e
c
l
i
n
e
 
o
f
 
7
%
 
o
n
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
 
r
e
m
a
i
n
i
n
g
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
m
.
 
F
o
r
 
a
 
s
m
a
l
l
e
r
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
o
f
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
t
h
e
y
 
c
a
n
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
 
f
o
r
 
t
w
o
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
p
o
s
t
 
t
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
,
 
a
 
t
w
o
-
y
e
a
r
 
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
6
%
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
j
o
b
 
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
n
e
w
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
.
-
-
D
a
v
i
s
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
(
2
0
0
9
)
1
,
4
0
0
 
U
S
 
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
(
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
1
4
,
0
0
0
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
)
 
t
h
a
t
 
u
n
d
e
r
w
e
n
t
 
a
n
 
L
B
O
.
 
1
9
8
0
-
2
0
0
5
U
.
S
.
A
S
M
;
 
L
B
D
;
 
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
I
Q
;
 
D
e
a
l
o
g
i
c
;
 
S
D
C
.
O
L
S
 
a
n
d
 
L
o
g
i
t
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
.
W
a
g
e
 
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
 
f
o
r
 
t
a
r
g
e
t
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
 
o
f
 
1
.
1
%
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
t
o
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
t
i
m
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
b
u
y
o
u
t
,
 
b
u
t
 
i
t
 
h
a
s
 
d
i
s
a
p
p
e
a
r
e
d
 
t
w
o
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
l
a
t
e
r
.
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
g
r
o
w
s
 
2
%
 
m
o
r
e
 
a
t
 
t
a
r
g
e
t
s
 
t
h
a
n
 
a
t
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
 
o
v
e
r
 
t
w
o
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
t
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
.
 
L
a
b
o
r
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
i
s
 
5
.
2
%
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
.
 
T
w
o
 
t
h
i
r
d
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
i
m
p
r
o
v
e
m
e
n
t
 
c
o
m
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
i
n
g
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
.
 
O
n
e
 
t
h
i
r
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
n
e
w
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
.
 
-
H
a
l
l
 
(
1
9
9
0
)
2
5
0
 
L
B
O
s
.
1
9
5
9
-
1
9
8
7
U
.
S
.
C
o
m
p
u
s
t
a
t
 
f
i
l
e
s
 
(
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
&
 
P
o
o
r
)
.
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
,
 
W
i
l
c
o
x
o
n
 
t
e
s
t
 
f
o
r
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
.
-
-
A
c
q
u
i
s
i
t
i
o
n
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
h
i
g
h
 
l
e
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
t
e
n
d
 
t
o
 
r
e
d
u
c
e
 
t
h
e
 
R
&
D
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
,
 
b
u
t
 
t
h
i
s
 
i
s
 
n
o
t
 
t
r
u
e
 
f
o
r
 
L
B
O
s
.
H
a
r
r
i
s
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
(
2
0
0
5
)
9
7
9
 
M
B
O
s
 
(
w
i
t
h
 
4
,
8
7
7
 
p
l
a
n
t
s
)
.
 
A
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
(
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
)
 
o
f
 
3
5
,
7
5
2
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
.
1
9
9
4
-
1
9
9
8
U
.
K
.
C
M
B
O
R
;
 
I
D
B
R
.
A
r
e
l
l
a
n
o
-
B
o
n
d
 
G
M
M
.
-
T
o
t
a
l
 
f
a
c
t
o
r
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
 
b
y
 
7
0
.
5
-
9
0
.
3
%
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
t
o
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
.
 
P
r
e
-
b
u
y
o
u
t
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
f
a
c
t
o
r
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
a
t
 
t
a
r
g
e
t
s
 
i
s
 
l
o
w
e
r
 
b
y
 
1
.
6
-
2
.
0
%
.
-
K
a
p
l
a
n
 
(
1
9
8
9
)
4
8
 
M
B
O
s
.
1
9
8
0
-
1
9
8
6
U
.
S
.
C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
;
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
&
 
P
o
o
r
'
s
 
D
a
i
l
y
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
P
r
i
c
e
R
e
c
o
r
d
.
C
o
m
p
a
r
i
n
g
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
.
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
d
 
b
y
 
0
.
9
%
,
 
b
u
t
 
i
n
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
m
e
d
i
a
n
,
 
M
B
O
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
h
a
v
e
 
1
2
%
 
l
o
w
e
r
 
j
o
b
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
.
-
-
L
e
r
n
e
r
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
(
2
0
0
8
)
4
9
5
 
L
B
O
s
.
1
9
8
0
-
2
0
0
5
U
.
S
.
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
I
Q
;
 
D
e
a
l
o
g
i
c
;
 
S
D
C
 
V
e
n
t
u
r
e
X
p
e
r
t
.
P
o
i
s
s
o
n
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
b
i
n
o
m
i
a
l
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
 
(
b
o
t
h
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
n
d
 
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
 
r
a
n
d
o
m
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
)
,
 
O
L
S
 
w
i
t
h
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
u
n
i
v
a
r
i
a
t
e
 
t
e
s
t
s
 
o
f
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
.
-
-
L
B
O
s
 
d
o
 
n
o
t
 
l
e
a
d
 
t
o
 
l
o
w
e
r
 
p
a
t
e
n
t
i
n
g
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
o
r
 
a
 
s
h
i
f
t
 
i
n
 
p
a
t
e
n
t
i
n
g
 
d
i
r
e
c
t
i
o
n
.
 
H
o
w
e
v
e
r
,
 
t
h
e
 
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
p
a
t
e
n
t
s
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
p
a
t
e
n
t
 
p
o
r
t
f
o
l
i
o
 
b
e
c
o
m
e
s
 
m
o
r
e
 
f
o
c
u
s
e
d
.
L
i
c
h
t
e
n
b
e
r
g
 
a
n
d
 
S
i
e
g
e
l
 
(
1
9
9
0
)
O
v
e
r
 
1
2
,
0
0
0
 
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
,
 
1
,
1
0
8
 
 
o
f
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
w
e
r
e
 
i
n
v
o
l
v
e
d
 
i
n
 
a
n
 
L
B
O
 
o
r
 
M
B
O
 
(
3
6
%
 
a
r
e
 
M
B
O
s
)
.
1
9
8
3
-
1
9
8
6
U
.
S
.
L
R
D
;
 
A
S
M
;
 
N
e
w
 
Y
o
r
k
 
T
i
m
e
s
,
 
W
a
l
l
 
S
t
r
e
e
t
 
J
o
u
r
n
a
l
.
W
L
S
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
,
 
K
r
u
s
k
a
l
-
W
a
l
l
i
s
 
t
e
s
t
 
f
o
r
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
 
i
n
 
m
e
d
i
a
n
s
.
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
d
e
c
l
i
n
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
w
h
i
t
e
 
c
o
l
l
a
r
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
 
 
8
.
5
%
 
o
v
e
r
 
3
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
 
i
n
 
b
l
u
e
-
c
o
l
l
a
r
 
w
a
g
e
s
 
o
f
 
3
.
6
%
.
 
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
i
s
 
u
n
c
h
a
n
g
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
b
l
u
e
-
c
o
l
l
a
r
 
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
.
 
 
L
B
O
 
t
a
r
g
e
t
s
 
h
a
v
e
 
a
 
m
e
d
i
a
n
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
 
i
n
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
5
.
9
%
 
a
s
 
c
o
m
p
a
r
e
d
 
t
o
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
 
o
n
e
 
t
o
 
t
h
r
e
e
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
p
o
s
t
-
L
B
O
.
 
T
a
r
g
e
t
s
 
g
a
v
e
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
a
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
2
.
3
%
 
o
n
e
 
t
o
 
t
h
r
e
e
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
b
e
f
o
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
b
u
y
o
u
t
.
N
o
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
o
n
 
R
&
D
 
s
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
.
 
T
a
r
g
e
t
 
p
l
a
n
t
s
 
a
r
e
 
l
e
s
s
 
R
&
D
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
v
e
 
(
2
.
5
%
 
l
o
w
e
r
 
i
n
 
m
e
a
n
 
o
n
e
 
t
o
 
t
h
r
e
e
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
b
e
f
o
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
b
u
y
o
u
t
)
 
a
n
d
 
a
r
e
 
c
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
l
e
s
s
 
R
&
D
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
e
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
.
L
o
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
R
a
v
e
n
s
c
r
a
f
t
 
(
1
9
9
3
)
7
2
 
L
B
O
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
R
&
D
 
a
n
d
 
1
2
6
 
w
i
t
h
 
n
o
 
R
&
D
.
 
3
,
3
2
9
 
n
o
n
-
L
B
O
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
a
s
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
.
1
9
8
1
-
1
9
8
7
U
.
S
.
N
S
F
;
 
Q
F
R
.
O
L
S
 
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
.
-
-
L
o
w
e
r
 
R
&
D
 
i
n
 
t
a
r
g
e
t
s
 
p
r
e
-
L
B
O
 
(
b
y
 
a
r
o
u
n
d
 
5
0
%
 
l
e
s
s
 
t
h
a
n
 
t
h
e
 
m
e
d
i
a
n
)
.
 
L
B
O
s
 
c
a
u
s
e
 
R
&
D
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
t
o
 
d
r
o
p
 
b
y
 
r
o
u
g
h
l
y
 
4
0
%
.
 
T
h
e
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
i
s
 
m
o
r
e
 
p
r
o
n
o
u
n
c
e
d
 
i
n
 
s
m
a
l
l
 
f
i
r
m
s
.
 
R
&
D
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
v
e
 
L
B
O
s
 
o
u
t
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
p
e
e
r
 
a
n
d
 
n
o
n
 
R
&
D
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
v
e
 
L
B
O
s
.A
u
t
h
o
r
 
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
d
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
T
i
m
e
 
s
p
a
n
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
D
a
t
a
 
s
o
u
r
c
e
M
e
t
h
o
d
 
o
f
 
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
I
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
o
n
M
u
s
c
a
r
e
l
l
a
 
a
n
d
 
V
e
t
s
u
y
p
e
n
s
 
(
1
9
9
0
)
7
2
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
w
e
r
e
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
l
y
 
h
e
l
d
 
u
n
d
e
r
w
e
n
t
 
a
n
 
L
B
O
,
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
n
 
o
n
c
e
 
m
o
r
e
 
w
e
n
t
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
(
I
P
O
)
.
1
9
8
3
-
1
9
8
7
U
.
S
.
C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
;
 
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
b
a
n
k
s
;
 
W
a
l
l
 
S
t
r
e
e
t
 
J
o
u
r
n
a
l
 
I
n
d
e
x
;
 
D
o
w
 
J
o
n
e
s
 
N
e
w
s
 
R
e
t
i
e
v
a
l
 
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
.
C
o
m
p
a
r
i
n
g
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
.
A
 
d
e
c
l
i
n
e
 
i
n
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
0
.
6
%
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
t
i
m
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
b
u
y
o
u
t
 
a
n
d
 
o
n
c
e
 
m
o
r
e
 
g
o
i
n
g
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
.
-
-
O
p
l
e
r
 
(
1
9
9
2
)
4
4
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
t
o
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
L
B
O
s
.
1
9
8
5
-
1
9
8
9
U
.
S
.
1
9
9
0
 
F
o
r
b
e
s
 
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
4
0
0
,
 
C
o
m
p
a
c
t
 
D
i
s
c
l
o
s
u
r
e
,
 
M
o
o
d
y
'
s
 
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
a
l
 
M
a
n
u
a
l
,
 
C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
 
I
I
 
P
S
T
,
 
F
C
.
W
i
l
c
o
x
o
n
 
s
i
g
n
e
d
 
r
a
n
k
 
t
e
s
t
s
.
N
o
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
n
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
.
-
N
o
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
n
 
R
&
D
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
.
S
m
i
t
h
 
(
1
9
9
0
)
5
8
 
M
B
O
s
.
1
9
7
7
-
1
9
8
6
U
.
S
.
C
O
M
P
U
S
T
A
T
;
 
M
a
r
a
i
s
,
 
S
c
h
i
p
p
e
r
 
a
n
d
 
S
m
i
t
h
 
(
1
9
8
9
)
;
 
M
e
r
g
e
r
s
t
a
t
 
R
e
v
i
e
w
.
C
o
m
p
a
r
i
n
g
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
,
 
W
i
l
c
o
x
o
n
 
s
i
g
n
e
d
 
r
a
n
k
 
t
e
s
t
.
W
e
a
k
 
d
e
c
l
i
n
e
s
 
i
n
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
(
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
1
0
%
 
l
e
v
e
l
)
.
-
N
o
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
n
 
R
&
D
 
s
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
.
U
g
h
e
t
t
o
 
(
2
0
1
0
)
6
8
1
 
W
e
s
t
e
r
n
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
 
t
o
 
a
 
b
u
y
o
u
t
 
(
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
t
o
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
d
e
a
l
s
)
.
1
9
9
8
-
2
0
0
4
W
e
s
t
e
r
n
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
V
e
n
t
u
r
e
S
o
u
r
c
e
,
 
V
e
n
t
u
r
e
 
E
x
p
e
r
t
,
 
A
m
a
d
e
u
s
,
 
D
e
l
p
h
i
o
n
 
(
E
P
O
 
p
a
t
e
n
t
 
d
a
t
a
)
W
i
l
c
o
x
o
n
 
s
i
g
n
e
d
 
r
a
n
k
 
t
e
s
t
s
,
 
l
o
g
i
s
t
i
c
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
.
-
-
P
a
t
e
n
t
i
n
g
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
 
p
o
s
t
-
b
u
y
o
u
t
 
(
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
p
a
t
e
n
t
s
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
 
b
y
 
a
r
o
u
n
d
 
5
0
%
 
f
r
o
m
 
1
.
0
6
 
t
o
 
1
.
5
9
)
.
 
T
h
e
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
L
B
O
 
a
f
f
e
c
t
 
p
a
t
e
n
t
i
n
g
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
:
 
s
y
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
d
 
d
e
a
l
s
,
 
a
 
b
u
y
o
u
t
 
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
i
z
e
d
 
l
e
a
d
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
o
r
,
 
a
 
l
e
a
d
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
o
r
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
 
l
a
r
g
e
 
p
o
r
t
f
o
l
i
o
 
o
f
 
c
o
m
p
a
n
i
e
s
 
t
e
n
d
s
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
c
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
 
i
n
 
p
a
t
e
n
t
i
n
g
 
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
.
 
G
e
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
a
l
 
p
r
o
x
i
m
i
t
y
 
a
n
d
 
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
d
o
 
n
o
t
 
s
e
e
m
 
t
o
 
m
a
t
t
e
r
.
W
e
i
r
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
(
2
0
0
8
)
1
2
2
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
t
o
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
b
u
y
-
o
u
t
s
.
1
9
9
8
-
2
0
0
4
U
.
K
.
H
a
n
d
 
c
o
l
l
e
c
t
e
d
,
 
C
M
B
O
R
 
d
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
.
W
i
l
c
o
x
o
n
 
s
i
g
n
e
d
 
r
a
n
k
 
t
e
s
t
s
.
L
B
O
s
 
t
a
r
g
e
t
s
 
e
x
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
d
 
j
o
b
 
l
o
s
s
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
t
w
o
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
L
B
O
,
 
b
u
t
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
t
h
e
n
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
d
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
t
o
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
r
e
m
a
i
n
i
n
g
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
i
n
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
f
o
u
r
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
v
e
.
-
-
W
r
i
g
h
t
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
(
1
9
9
2
)
1
8
2
 
L
B
O
s
1
9
8
3
-
1
9
8
6
U
.
K
.
A
u
t
h
o
r
s
 
o
w
n
 
s
u
r
v
e
y
;
 
C
M
B
O
R
 
d
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
.
C
o
m
p
a
r
i
n
g
 
a
n
s
w
e
r
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
q
u
e
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